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HERACLES' BOW:
Persuasion and Community
in Sophocles' Philoctetes
by Jam es Boyd White
This is a highly abridged version of the title essay of Professor
White's recent book, Heracles' Bow: Essays on the Rhetoric and Poetics of the Law.© 1985, The University of
Wisconsin Press; reprinted by permission .
Here he presents a reading of Sophocles' play Philoctetes,
which is about the ethical significance of different forms of
persuasion, a matter of some significance for lawyers . The
play in fact establishes with great clarity a contrast that has
been fundamental in Western ethical thought ever since, between treating another person as an object of manipulation
- as a "means" to an end - and treating (him or her) a one
who has claims to autonomy and respect equal to one's own ,
that is, as an "end" in himself. Thi contrast ha a special
and disturbing significance for someone who, like the lawyer,
makes an art of persuading others.
In the course of life it happens again and again - in
the family, the workplace, the street, the international
arena - that a crisis arises in which we are faced with
the possibility of establishing or losing community.
Rhetoric, as I use the term - the art of "persuasion"
in its broadest sense - is the art by which we address
these possibilities. As our desires, our enses of ourselves, are seen to work together, we come together,
for the moment or for a longer time, making a common

world defined by a common set of mutually intelligible
roles and activities; or, as we feel ourselves to be opposed, we divide into separate, perhaps hostile,
groups or units. A community may be momentary,
based upon a sense of common ground that is quickly
lost, or it may be stable and enduring. How do we how can we - address these possibilities? What can
we say to one another, or to ourselves, about our own
desires and those of others, about who we are and
who we want to be, and with what possible meanings,
what possible successes? When is a persuasive success
an ethical failure, or an ethical success a persuasive
failure? What is the role of truth and sincerity in
what we do?
For the lawyer these are especially critical questions.
A lawyer' s professional day is largely made up of conversations, oral and written, in which the object is to
persuade another to a particular view. In this sense he
or she is a professional rhetorician, and must be concerned with the possibilities of rhetoric as a way of
life . In this essay I want to work out a way of trunking
about the ethics of persuasion by looking at Sophocles'
Philoctetes, a play that has much to teach us about how
persuasion works, and can work, and what it means
to give yourself to a life of per uasion of one kind
or another.
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he narrative form in which
these questions are presented
in the play is this . Philoctetes
lives alone on an uninhabited
island in the Aegean where,
because of a foul-smelling
and festering wound on his
foot, he was cast out ten years earlier by the Achaeans
on their way to Troy. His wound was inflicted by a serpent that bit him when he stepped on sacred ground;
hi cries of pain, we are told, prevented the others
from making proper sacrifices and libations. During
his year on the island he has been able to live only because he has with him the wonderful bow and arrows
of Heracles, given him for a kindness done - Philoctetes lit his funeral pyre - and these are weapons that
never miss. Now the Achaeans have been told by a
soothsayer that they cannot capture Troy without that
bow, and have sent Odysseus and Neoptolernus,
Achilles' son, to bring it back.
These two actors are presented with an archetypal
question of what I will call "constitutive rhetoric": how
to bring into a community an isolated individual who
is now outside it. The first question the play addresses
is how they are to proceed, and that question is presented both as a practical one -what will work? and as an ethical one-what is right for them to do?
The most obvious possibility, though the least talked
about in this scene, is honest persuasion. For that to
succeed, a speaker would have to find a way of talking
about what has happened, and what will happen, that
Philoctetes and the Achaeans could both accept, and
which could thus serve as the ground of a newly constituted community between them. By "way of talking" I mean a whole language: a shared set of terms for
telling the story of what has happened and what will
happen, for the expression of motive and value, and
for the enactment of those movements of the mind
leading to a common end that we call reason. Whoever
speaks to Philoctetes in this way must find a way to tell
the story- the whole story- that leads naturally to
his return . Such a common language, such a common
story, is in fact what we mean by a community. The
art of sincere statement by which this kind of genuine
community is established can for our purposes be
called, and in a restriction of the range of meaning of
the Greek term is called by Sophocles, "persuasion"
(peitho) .

In the play Odysseus says that this kind of persuasion will simply not work against Philoctetes' intransigence - we can see, indeed, that an attempt
might only put him on his guard- and that they must
therefore practice persuasion of a different kind, a sort
of trick or deceitful stratagem (dolos). He tells Neoptolernus to win the confidence of Philoctetes by pretending to be sailing back to Greece after a hurnilia-
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tion at the hands of the Achaeans. (He is to say that
they awarded his dead father's armor to Odysseus .)
Neoptolernus should offer Philoctetes passage home,
and this will enable them to get close enough to get
his bow.
Neoptolernus objects that this kind of trickery is inconsistent with his most fundamental conceptions f
honor, and urges the use of force (bia) or persuasion
(peitho). But Odysseus explains that they have no
alternative: force can never prevail against the
weapons of Heracles, and persuasion too is bound to
fail. Philoctetes would kill them if he knew who they
were, and he could certainly not be talked into corning
with them.
Neoptolernus is himself "persuaded" by Odysseus
- in which sense of the word we shall soon discover
- and goes along with the plan. The rest of the play
is about his (and our) discovery of what that decision
really means, both in practical and in ethical terms . As
things work out Neoptolernus in fact obtains the bow,
but he becomes so disgusted with himself that he returns it (over Odysseus' violent objection) and does
what he wished to do in the first place: he seeks to persuade Philoctetes to come with them voluntarily, on
the grounds that this will b.e best for him as well as for
them. (His wound will be cured by the sons of Asclepius at Troy, and he will fulfill his fate and achieve
great renown .) But Philoctetes remains obdurate and
insists that Neoptolernus keep his promise to take him
home . Neoptolernus is about to comply when Heracles
miraculously appears and tells Philoctetes that he
should indeed go to Troy, where he will be cured and
win great glory. Philoctetes complies, and the play
ends with his farewell to his island.
Even from this outline it can be seen that the play
presents its audience with a real puzzle. We are led
to despise Odysseus and to admire Neoptolernus'
change of heart; yet Odysseus' way is shown to have
"worked" - it got the bow - and Neoptolernus'
way to have failed . The play itself seems to require
the intrusion of a deus ex machina to save it from a
chaotic and impossible ending . All this suggests two
sets of questions. First, how are we to make sense
of the play itself, as a work of art? What, that is, is
Sophocles asking us to think and feel about the two
modes of persuasion - the two kinds of character
and community - opposed here, and how does he
seek to evoke this response? Second, what ought
we to think about the substance of the questions that
this play defines, both in general - as a matter of
philosophical ethics - and in the context of modern
law? To focus on one example of particular significance to us: what kind of persuasion (peitho or dolos)
does the lawyer practice, and what does it mean what can the lawyer make it mean - that he or she
does so?

t is worth examining the initial conversation between
Odysseus and Neoptolemus
in some detail, for their argument about the proper way
to approach Philoctetes is itself a performance of one
kind of persuasion, one kind of community, and it
set forth the major polarity from which the play
will proceed.
For Odysseus it is all very simple: they are sent to
obtain the bow, and the only issue is how they may
most certainly obtain it. His is a classic form of endsmeans rationality, which naturally focuses on the
possible and the impossible, on the probable and
the improbable, and regards everything in the world,
including itself, as an instrument to obtain the ends
it is given. The only question is success . Odysseus
does not in fact even argue that the end justifies the
means, for justification is not an issue for him. (In
the language of modern sports, winning is not the
most important thing, it is the only thing .) This is
his view not only of the way they should approach
Philoctetes, but, as we shall see, of the way he
should treat Neoptolemus as well.
Neoptolemus' position, by contrast, is based upon
his sense of his own character or identity. His reason
for balking at the use of stratagem is self-centered,
almost aesthetic: deceit is beneath his dignity. He
rests on his nature and paternity: he is a certain kind
of person, in part by reason of his birth, and it is his
sense of who he is that will be his ethical guide . His
initial response to Odysseus' suggestion is a kind of
instinctive reaction, learned but not wholly understood: for him force and persuasion are both acceptable, but deceit is not. His objection to deceit has
nothing to do with recognizing Philoctetes' autonomy or value as a person (for force is by nature
coercive) but rests rather upon his sense of what i
appropriate for him, Neoptolemus, to do .
The method by which Odysseus persuades Neoptolemus to abandon the sense of character upon
which he relies, to " give himself" to Odysseus for " a
single day" (lines 83-84), is a performance in practice
of the doctrine Odysseus e pouses . It is a skillful
seduction of a standard kind: not peitho but dolos.
Odysseus waits to present Neoptolemus with the
issue until the very moment of action, thus depriving him of the possibility of thought and reflection;
and he springs upon him now, for the first time,
the news that he will not be able to achieve his own
great destiny as the destroyer of Troy unless they
obtain the bow. This is an end that Neoptolemus
cannot deny, and he acquiesces in the mean necessary to attain it, shameful to him though they are.
Odysseus thus disintegrates Neoptolemus' sense f

self, his only ethical guide, by establishing an unforeseen conflict within it. The way this kind of persuasion works here, as elsewhere in the world, is
that the successful persuader gets what he w ants
now and leaves the other to try to put his life and
character together again afterwards on his ow n .
This is one performance of what it may m ean to
regard another as an instrument.

hat will it mean for Neoptolemus to do what he has
agreed to do? Odys eus has
given a simple version - it
will mean " success" - but in
terms that are impossible for us
to accept, even for a moment.
The play now shows us what this deception will
mean in other terms, and Neoptolemus' betrayal of
Philoctetes - who is the soul of frankness, warmth
and generosity - is terrible to witness. When Neoptolemus finally comes to see that this course of deceit
is impossible for him, and restores the bow, he gives
himself the opportunity to do what he thought
should have been done in the first place, that is, to
achieve his mission of bringing Philoctetes back to
the Achaean community not by deceit (dolos) nor, as
he now sees, by force (bia), but by persuasion
(peitho) . And what he means by persuasion is not the
art of manipulating others to adopt one' s position,
but the art of stating fully and sincerely the grounds
upon which one thinks common action can and
should rest.
In his speech of appeal to Philoctetes Neoptolemus
claims that he has been improperly harboring his
sense of injury, and he justifies this view, to Philoctetes and to us, by locating his present request in a
transformed narrative of Philoctetes' life . This story
defines Philoctetes not as one who simply " suffers
terribly" nor as one who " suffers at the hands of the
hated Achaeans," as Philoctetes wants to do, but as
one who suffers for a reason that can be understood
and stated. He suffers because he stepped on the
sacred ground. It is not an issue whether he was
at fault in doing so, for the point of Neoptolemus'
statement is neither to blame nor to excuse Philoctetes for taking that step . Similarly, it is not an issue
whether the Achaeans were right or wrong to abandon him: there is no discussion of the necessity of
the abandonment - for example, whether their sacrifices really were disturbed, as Odysseus claimed or of available alternatives to it. The question is seen
as one of causation, not blame, and this implicitly
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suggests that cure, rather than revenge, can be the
aim. To stop the obsessive (if understandable) process of blaming and excusing frees the mind to think
about how the wound can be healed: by the "arts of
Asclepius" as Neoptolemus puts it, or, more significantly for us, by Philoctetes' reintegration into the
community of which he was once a part. On Philoctetes' side, he must give up his love for his own
illness . What is required of him, before he can be
cured, is forgiveness - forgiveness of others and
forgiveness of himself, for it was his own misstep
that brought about the injury and the subsequent
abandonment.
Neoptolemus' speech thus operates at once
as a recognition of Philoctetes' experience, as a
reinterpretation of it in light of what else is known,
and as a conversion, by narrative, of the intolerable
into the tolerable. It has obvious parallels with psychoanalysis, and in both cases the ruling values are
truthfulness, recognition, and integration.
But this persuasive statement in fact fails, and
fails for reasons that Neoptolemus should be able
to understand, for they are rooted in a sense of
appropriateness and self-respect. Philoctetes now in
essence asks, "How can I come before the others,
how can I possibly join with them, after what has
happened?" (lines 1352-57). He insists that Neoptolemus keep his promise to take him home. Neoptolemus is about to comply when Heracles appears
and restates to Philoctetes the story of his life and
the necessity and propriety of his return. This time
Philoctetes accepts and is persuaded.

ow are we to read and understand this sequence of
events, especially the ultimate failure of Neoptolemus' persuasion and the
need for Heracles' intervention at the end? And what of
the fact that Odysseus' method of persuasion succeeded? What do these events mean as part of what
Sophocles is saying in the play, and what do we, independently of the play, think of the issues it presents? We can start by returning to the initial polarity between Odysseus and Neoptolemus, out of
which the play moves .
In reading the opening scene one quickly sees that
Odysseus habitually regards everything and everybody as an instrument, as a means to an end, but
the consequences of this habit of thought emerge
only gradually in the course of the play. Consider,
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for example, his mistake as to the meaning of the
soothsayer's prophecy, which provides an assumption essential to his argument in the opening scene.
Odysseus reads the prophecy as requiring the two
men simply to "get the bow" as though the weapon
had a kind of magic that would automatically win
the war for them. This kind of reading is natural for
a mind given to his instrumental way of thinking.
But as the play proceeds we learn that the soothsayer's command is to obtain not just the bow but Philoctetes and that Philoctetes' return to the community must be voluntary. And we learn this fact in an
interesting way: partly by a kind of accident, as one
speaker or another states the authoritative command
differently and with varying degrees of reliability,
but much more importantly in another way, which
has great relevance to the interpretation of all authoritative texts, legal among the rest. For the true
meaning of the command is most reliably discovered
by Neoptolemus gradually, as he matures, not by
learning more about the actual words the soothsayer
uttered but by learning more about the situation to
which he spoke.
To one who learns to see things and to think
about them as Neoptolemus does, and as we do too,
it is not only immoral but unrealistic to think that all
that is required here is the physical acquisition of an
instrument, an inert bow and its arrows. What is required, as anyone with eyes can see - and this is after all what the soothsayer saw - is that the breach
in the community created by Philoctetes' abandonment must be healed, and it can only be healed by
his free and voluntary return. He must become a
member of the community once more. This means
that deceit cannot get the Achaeans what they want
(nor indeed can Neoptolemus' original alternative,
force): only persuasion, and persuasion of the sincere and authentic kind by which community is
established (peitho), can work.
To conceive of what goes wrong as a matter of
reading: Odysseus shows that he is incapable of
reading a perfectly sensible directive in an intelligent
way. In the law, we call such readers literalists: they
are given to reading authoritative texts as "literal"
commands without regard to their evident purpose
and nature and without regard to the universe of
understandings and commitments that render them
comprehensible. Such a reader, then as now, is in
fact likely to miss not only the true meaning of a text
but its very words, as Odysseus does - to fail even
at the task of literalism itself. The modern lawyer can
perhaps thus take some heart from what Sophocles
shows him: Odysseus is not a model of the crafty
lawyer after all, unscrupulous but effective, rational
but base, but an example of a lawyer who is bad in
both senses of the term. At just the level where his

claims for himself are most seriously made, that he is
a pragmatic success, he is in fact a total failure .
What Odysseus misses is the reality of the social
world, and its power. His cast of mind, which itemizes the world into a chain of desiderata and mechanisms, is incapable of understanding the reality
and force of shared understandings and confidences .
This error appears today in the common idea that
our "wealth" is material - the bringing of resources
under individual control for purposes of exchange
or consumption - while in fact our most important
wealth is social and cultural: confidence in the
reliability and good sense and generosity of our
neighbors; trust in the reciprocal practices by which
community is established; pleasure in finding, and
making, shared meanings, and in elaborating them
cooperatively; or, in terms of this play, confidence
and pleasure in those social activities by which
Neoptolemus and Philoctetes create a world of
action and significance, a world so full of meaning
for Neoptolemus that he cannot betray it. Think of
our own desire for physical safety: whether one
speaks of international relations, city streets, the
workplace, or the family, the healthy and just community achieves a kind of security that mere force
can never attain.
The ultimate fact about Odysseus is his disappearance into nothingness at the end. Once Neoptolemus faces him down he evaporates off the stage,
to reappear only as a possible target for Philoctetes .
The man whose great claim is to be a source of competent energy ends up literally nothing at all. The
power of evil is only apparent, for in the realm of
character and community it has no force , no actuality, against an integrated mind .
This beautifully dramatized evaporation is implicit
in Odysseus' mode of thinking, for one thing endsmeans rationality cannot do is choose its ends . They
must be taken as givens . Compare the most systematic modern version of this kind of thought, market
economics, in which ends are explicitly taken as external to the system: preferences are whatever any
person happens to prefer, and all preferences are
equal until given different values through the prices
paid or obtained for them. Because Odysseus cannot
think about the proper choice of ends, his whole being is spent in the service of ends that he cannot examine . As for the choice of means, Odysseus' attention to probability and improbability, cost and benefit, locates the authority for that choice outside the
self, in the world, for the only question is what will
work best. Such a mind cannot constitute a self.
Odysseus in fact makes this consequence of his
thought explicit when he tells Neoptolemus to give
himself " for just one shameful day, then to be the
most honorable of men," and when he says that he

himself "is capable of virtue when that is the game,
but not when it is not": he says that he is whatever
the situation calls for (line 1049). From one point of
view this is familiar cynical advice not to be a goodygoody. From another, however, it is a horrifying
statement of a person without a self, without a soul,
for Odysseus seems wholly unaware that who he is
today has, or can have, any relation to who he will
be tomorrow, or was yesterday. For him the self
has no continuity but is a series of discrete and unconnected actions and moments of consciousness,
a set of fragments . This means that rational thought
about, and action in, the social and cultural realm is
impossible. Think of the social practices that Neoptolemus and Philoctetes share : could Odysseus
pledge, or promise, or give or receive a trust?
If Odysseus is the pure "consequentialist" who
fails to understand consequences of the most important kind, Neoptolemus is an exemplar of what can
be called " character ethics" who at first fails to maintain his character. But as Odysseus becomes an increasingly destructive and empty version of himself,
Neoptolemus is shown to develop, largely through
the friendship of Philoctetes, into a mature and autonomous person who knows and can defend his
own values . When Philoctetes' intractability presents
him with a conflict between two different futures for
himself, as one who is successful in destroying Troy
and as one who is true to his pledge to and friendship with Philoctetes, Neoptolemus knows which to
choose. This time he does not disintegrate.

hat are we then to make of
the fact that Neoptolemus'
noble form of persuasion
fails and Odysseus' ignoble
form succeeds? Does this not
upset the whole structure of
value I have just outlined
and undermine what seems to be the most important
meaning of the play?
This is the central difficulty to which the play is
written, and understanding it requires two initial
clarifications . Despite what I have just suggested, the
play makes dear that Neoptolemus' ultimate attempt
to persuade Philoctetes in fact fails not because it
is weaker than some alternative, but either because
nothing would ever have succeeded against such intransigence or because the prior deception has alienated Philoctetes irreparably . We simply do not know
what the result would have been had Neoptolemus
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come t Philoctetes at the beginning, explaining
that the o thsayer had pr phesied his cure, and o
forth, and urging his return . As it is, Philoctetes has
ju t suffered a terrible abuse of trust at the hands of
Odys eus and Neoptolemus, and it may be thi that
make him so intractable. The proper kind of persuasi n might have led t successful reconciliation and a
pr per reading of the play will keep that possibility
in mind, at least as part of the background.
And in any event, as I suggested above, Odysseu ' methods proved not to be successful. The play
in fact how that they will fail every time that true
c peration is required, f r all that can possibly
be obtained this way is an instrument or object,
a ''b w," and not the creation of a functioning
community. The failure of Neoptolemus' persuasion,
if failure there be, is thus not to be taken as an
argument for the methods of Odysseus, which
will fail even more certainly, at least on occasions
like thi one.
Where this leaves us is with the enforced recognition of certain central ethical and practical truths:
that there is no sure-fire method of attaining your
ends when those ends require the cooperation of
others and that to recognize the freedom and autonomy f another, which is the only real possibility if
one is to succeed at all, is necessarily to leave room
for the exercise of that freedom and autonomy in
ways you do not wish.
But there is more to it than that, for the play is at
its heart about the conditions under which ethical
and practical thought take place, about their ontology and epistemology if you will. Here its major
point i that the only circumstances under which
ends-means rationality might be rational never exist,
for our thought must always take place on conditions of uncertainty that render that kind of
"rationality" worse than useless. These conditions
require us to think in other, more difficult, ways
and to attend first and last to questions of character
and community. The only rational "ends" - the
only end we can confidently use as guides to
·conduct - are conceptions of ourselves and of our
relation with others, not materially describable
tates f affairs.
How does Sophocles establish these conditions of
uncertainty and make them vivid? In this connection
consider ur initial mistake about the meaning of
the prophecy, and the dominance of Odysseus'
interpretation of it over us and Neoptolemus alike in
the opening scene. As readers (or as an audience),
we at first hare Ody seus' mistake, and think that
only the b w is required, for how could we do
therwi e? We accept his tatement of the premises
of the expedition and only gradually come to perceive the conditions of life that render those pre-
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mises impossible . We are led to misread so that our
reading can be corrected .
When we learn that the meaning of the prophecy
i uncertain, we at first want to know "what it
says," that is, what its words are . This, we think,
will enable us to judge what the characters should
do . But in the real world we live always in uncertainty, without such clear prophecies or other directives; our hunger for clarity will not be satisfied;
and we must accept the fact that our ethical and
moral imperatives must in part be constructed by us
- as the meaning of the prophecy in this play ultimately is - out of the materials of the world with
which we are presented, out of the evident meanings and demands of the situation. In not giving us a
reliable version of the prophecy until the very end and even then giving it to us in a different form and in showing us that we can nonetheless judge
what is right, the play teaches us to accept the
responsibilities of maturity and the conditions of
uncertainty on which human life is led.
This suggests an answer to one who responds to
the play by saying: "But don't we sometimes need
only the bow and not the man? And then what
Odysseus does would be justified, wouldn't it?"
The answer is this: we do not know - we can never
know - that we need the bow and not the man.
To think that we do, or might, need only the bow,
and to contrive on that basis is to commit ourselves
to a course that is irrational as well as unethical.

ur thought about ethics and justice,
about our practical social and political lives, must acknowledge
that the facts, the imperatives,
and the motives of ourselves and
others are not fixed but uncertain,
in a sense always made by us in conversation with each other. The conditions for pure
ends-means rationality never exist. The habit of
mind that yearns for these methods and their
certainties is bound to be delusive, and ultimately despite its claims to superior rationality - to be
irrational, because it will not be in accordance with
the nature of our world and our experience . The
only way to function rationally in these domains is
to recognize the radical uncertainty in which we live;
to proceed by trial and error; to operate with a constant pressure towards openness; to acknowledge
the necessity of community and cooperation both to
the definition and to the attainment of any of our

"ends"; to realize that one aim of life is the
transformation of our own perceptions, wishes, and
selves; and to regard the central intellectual imperative as the integration of all we can perceive, of
all that we are, into meaningful wholes.
A second reality made vivid by the play is its insistence that all social action requires community and
that community can never be compelled. Slaves will
revolt, spouses will divorce, workmen will unite,
partners will resign, allies will default, and often
they will do so in the face of death itself. Our practical and moral lives are radically communal - unless perhaps we live alone on an island - and this
means that our thought about what we want and
who we are must reflect the freedom and power of
others, without whose free cooperation we can have
nothing of value, be nothing of value. This in turn
means that hardheaded practical thought and sound
ethical thought alike require us to recognize the existence of others and our dependence upon them .
Our most practical end is never definable in terms
of material results but always and only in terms of
a certain kind of community: a way of facing the uncertainties of life together. These are the conditions
of our existence; rhetoric is the art by which they are
addressed.
But the play does more even than this, for in its
demonstration of what it means to treat another as
an "end" or as a "means" it establishes standards by
which we can judge particular conduct and speech,
particular relations and communities . This literary
demonstration in the text, as read or performed,
has a clarity and force - a persuasiveness - that
theoretical argument could never have, for it works
by constituting the audience in a new way. The play
addresses the whole reader, not just one capacity or
faculty, and evokes an integrated response, in which
pleasure, excitement, enjoyment, commitment, as
well as learning, are engaged. It integrates the e perience and the self, locating them in the conditions
of uncertainty in which we must actually live. The
audience is newly constituted by the play in a new
position, from which the only imaginable attitude to
take towards persuasion and community is that of
recognition and integration, the only imaginable
rhetoric is sincere and authentic.
The community the play creates with us in fact
has an actuality the others lack: it exists in space and
time, in our minds and responses, as on a hot morning in the theater we become something, collectively
and individually, for which we earlier had only the
potentiality. The true meaning of the play is our response to it, who we become in response to it. This
is what is most real about it, and the experience
teaches us how to live in the uncertain world it
represents: what to value and cling to, what to dis-

regard, where to direct our attention and our energy.
For the rest of us, lawyers especially, this means
that we must ask what worlds, what communities,
our expressions and writings and conversations create. In our hands, what kind of theater can the law
be, or become? When we practice law we represent
others, whose needs to some degree determine
our "ends/' and our task is to "succeed": does that
mean that, despite this play, we must act like Odysseus or be false to our profession? Must we see the
"bow of Heracles" simply as an object, or can we see
it as having a meaning that is essentially social and
rhetorical: as standing for the autonomy and maturity of persons whose voluntary cooperation, upon
equal terms, is always to be sought; a symbol of the
attainment of full personality, for which community
is always necessary? ~

James Boyd White is a profe sor of English and adjunct
professor of classical studies as well a the L. Hart Wri ht
Professor of Law at Michigan. He has been teaching at the
Law School since 1983.
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